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Jane Anna Gordon, Creolizing Political Theory: Reading Rousseau Through 
Fanon. New York: Fordham University Press, 2014. 309 pp. $30.00, 
paperback.  
 
Jane Anna Gordon’s Creolizing Political Theory is an ambitious 
text. Not only does it take up the task of offering rigorous readings of 
two challenging figures (Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Frantz Fanon), 
but it also engages in a far-ranging critical intervention in the 
disciplinary norms of political theory. It is thus both a work of critical 
hermeneutics directed toward key figures in political thought, and a 
meta-critique of political theory as such. A key to understanding that 
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meta-critique is her use of the concept of creolization, which is meant 
to contrast with the more traditional notion of comparison (as in 
“comparative political studies”). Gordon takes herself, in other words, 
to be articulating, advocating, and modeling a significant shift in the 
methodology of political theory, one in which “disparate disciplinary 
and methodological resources are brought together to create unique 
amalgams better attuned to addressing salient political problems and 
debates thrown open by the complexity of human institutions of 
power” (2). The book is, despite the scope of its project, remarkably 
successful. 
 
“To creolize political theory,” Gordon tells us in the introduction, 
“is to break with identity-oriented conceptions of disciplines and 
methods, those through which one aims to make oneself and one’s 
work isomorphic with seemingly preexisting conceptions of what a 
disciplinary community indicates one must be and must not do” (12). 
Offering a critical appraisal of what she sees as the dominant trend in 
which disciplines seek to articulate and maintain conditions of purity 
“for the sake of making each academic niche more coherently itself, 
more rigorous through autonomous differentiation (7),” she prescribes 
instead a prioritization of the demands of engaged inquiry as opposed 
to disciplinary norms and standards of purity. Placing the line of 
inquiry at the forefront, she argues, will require that we draw upon the 
varied resources of a variety of disciplines and methods in order to 
adequately pursue the questions that serve as one’s driving telos. 
However, she warns us, such processes of creolization should not be 
understood as ends in themselves, which can result in a naïve leveling 
of competing methods and perspectives. Rather, creolization will 
emerge when we place the larger goal of understanding political life 
above those disciplinary concerns that can “straight-jacket” our efforts 
(7). So many lines of inquiry emerge only within and through a 
particular discipline, and consequently serve more to reify disciplinary 
norms and standards than they do to settle pressing human questions 
and address real problems. The call for creolization, ultimately, is a call 
not to eschew or ignore concepts of disciplinary rigor altogether, but 
rather to break with the habit of seeing those disciplinary norms as a 
kind of self-justifying (theodician) technique oriented toward the 
dismissal of all that cannot be captured within it. The book is organized 
as an effort to demonstrate a moment of creolization within political 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Radical Philosophy Review, Vol 18, No. 1 (2015): pg. 169-173. DOI. This article is © Philosophy Documentation Center and 
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Philosophy Documentation Center 
does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express 
permission from Philosophy Documentation Center. 
3 
 
theory, and the proof of Gordon’s approach will be in the proverbial 
pudding. 
 
The first chapter, “Delegitimizing Decadent Inquiry,” focuses on 
Rousseau as a kind of methodological revolutionary. Gordon discusses 
Rousseau’s writings not only on politics and the social sciences, but 
also on musicology. In all of these arenas, she argues, Rousseau 
positioned himself as a critic of modernity even as he articulated and 
refined some of its central ideas. Rousseau’s corpus not only ranged 
widely in terms of fields of study, but also in terms of sources and 
topics. From Chinese and Indian music to the indigenous peoples of 
Africa and the Americas, Rousseau “[put] himself outside of his time 
and place” (24) in his efforts to “[synthesize] domains of life and study 
that have since splintered into autonomous areas of inquiry” (55). 
Gordon’s overview of Rousseau’s methodology concludes that, even “if 
Rousseau’s ideas about human difference did not reflect the possibility 
of creolization, his methods or approaches to his own inquiries, which 
were heavily synthetic, surely did” (55), and so we might say that 
“while he was not himself a creolized thinker, . . . he introduced ideas 
and orientations into political reflection that invite productive 
creolization by others” (25). 
 
In the second chapter Gordon turns her attention to Frantz 
Fanon, arguing that, like Rousseau, Fanon sought “to challenge the 
ways that reason had been used to advance the singularity of 
particular models of desirable political arrangements and ways of being 
human” (63). She traces Fanon’s struggles to come to grips with the 
pathologies of coloniality, offering nuanced readings of both Black 
Skin, White Masks and Wretched of the Earth. Her focus throughout is 
on Fanon’s revelation that the colonial world not only shapes the 
institutions, languages, and peoples who inhabit it, but also the 
methods by and through which we study that world, even when our 
aim is to criticize it. Thus, like Rousseau, Fanon aims to understand 
the ways and means of unfreedom and alienation, and finds that doing 
so requires a critical confrontation with “prevailing conceptions of 
authoritative reason that they demonstrate have been used far more 
to justify the curbing of human liberty that to aid its deepening or 
expansion” (91). She concludes the chapter by arguing that, though 
Fanon pushes beyond Rousseau in certain significant ways, especially 
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in relation to the latter’s understanding of the colonized, both were at 
heart concerned with very similar problems, thus making a strong case 
that their creolizing encounter will be a fruitful one. 
 
Affirming that both Rousseau and Fanon sought in their 
respective work to provide “diagnoses of illegitimate politics” (95), 
Gordon’s third chapter takes up Rousseau’s concept of the general will, 
focusing on the problematics of articulating a worthwhile notion of the 
general as such. She describes her understanding of this problem in 
the following terms: “As opposed to both a reified particularity that 
would fix its borders as stone and to the search for an absolute, 
limitless universality, the general seeks within certain bounds to 
integrate meaningfully abiding differences” (96). To avoid what 
Rousseau sees as an empty and abstract universal on the one hand, 
and the competitive melee of conflicting individual wills on the other, 
the general will aims to forge a unity in and through the articulation of 
shared meanings that make possible the very conceptualization of 
group autonomy. A highlight of this chapter is Gordon’s sustained 
engagement with Rousseau’s work on Corsica, exploring the question 
of “how the island could aim to become a genuinely postcolonial state” 
(117). She uses this in particular to draw out Rousseau’s conception of 
the formation of a sense of shared purpose and identity among the 
Corsicans, something that he thought was essential to their success as 
a nation, and a question that Fanon would late take up in his own 
writings on National Consciousness, which is the subject of Gordon’s 
next chapter. 
 
Like Rousseau’s general will, Gordon argues in the fourth 
chapter, Fanon’s conception of national consciousness “seeks out and 
expresses what different people have in common” (132). Both are 
efforts to conceptualize the drawing together of disparate political 
elements into an often fragile, but fundamentally active, unity. There 
is a significant difference, however, in that the general will focuses on 
preserving and “maintaining rare conditions and fragile relations under 
which it first emerged,” such that “the stituted” (133). For Fanon, 
however, national consciousness “takes shape through collaborative 
struggles first to oust those people and interests fundamentally 
opposed to the emergence of an indigenous citizenry’s will and then to 
move beyond this to . . . creating institutions that would develop a 
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nation that had been an appendage to another metropolitan center” 
(133). For Gordon, national consciousness carries on, in a sense, the 
project of the general will, but places the alienated, exploited, and 
colonized in the foreground as the protagonists of this political drama, 
and understands the task to be always oriented toward a future in 
“questions of political life could never be settled once and for all,” and 
she concludes that “Fanon therefore fruitfully historicizes and reworks 
Rousseau without ever collapsing into what can be read in the latter as 
moments of conservative nostalgia” (161). 
 
The fifth chapter, along with the conclusion, further elaborates 
the sense of creolizing that Gordon is deploying throughout the text. 
Beginning with a brief yet erudite account of the use of the term in the 
descriptive mode of creolization often applied to language and culture 
(she acknowledges that the term has also often been applied to 
biological mixture, but the linguistic/cultural is her focus here), Gordon 
emphasizes what she takes to be the core meaning of the term – that 
diverse linguistic or cultural practices are brought together in a way 
that produces something importantly new that nevertheless maintains 
aspects of its constitutive components. She quickly moves to an 
account of the prescriptive mode, which is the major theme of her 
text, being the call for a creolization of political theory. Here the aim is 
to bring together diverse elements or subjects of study in ways that 
neither reify difference nor make appeal to facile universalism. This, in 
turn, requires that the theorist bracket prior commitments to 
disciplinary purity that close off potential avenues of productive 
creolizing encounter. Rather than taking canonical figures (real political 
theorists) and either treating them as a complete universe in their own 
right, or at best as the source of theoretical resources to be 
productively applied to the experiences of the marginalized and 
oppressed, Gordon’s text stands as a call to treat the canonical and 
the marginal as equal participants in our effort to articulate and 
confront the ways and means of freedom and oppression, and given 
the current state of her discipline, this is a radical move. 
 
Creolizing Political Theory makes a significant contribution to the 
scholarship on Rousseau and Fanon, all while issuing a call to action in 
the form of prescriptive creolization. There is certainly a great deal 
more to be said about all three of these individual elements. Rousseau 
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and Fanon scholars should find the arguments and interpretations 
offered here challenging and stimulating, though not necessarily fully 
satisfying, given that they could easily be taken up in book-length 
studies in their own right. Likewise, the articulation and discussion of 
creolizing is exciting and provocative, but certainly raises as many 
questions as it answers. For my part, I wonder about the ultimate 
telos of processes of creolization (of theory). Especially if, as Gordon 
argues, creolization works best when it is not our explicit goal (184), 
then the questions remain both as to what kinds of aims are most 
conducive to creolizing practices on the one hand, and what long-term 
success in creolizing political theory would look like on the other. Such 
lingering questions are, however, to be expected of a text that stands 
first and foremost as an inauguration of a budding movement in 
political theory. It is not the final word, but rather an opening 
declaration of a shift in method, and a demonstration of one way in 
which that method can be practiced. Seen in this light, the book is a 
remarkable success, and one that I hope will take its place in the 
vanguard of a new approach to political theory.  
 
 
